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From Morality to Virtue

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  • 296 páginas
  • 11 horas de lectura

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Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being

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From Morality to Virtue, Michael A. Slote

Idioma
Publicado en
1995
Encuadernación
(Tapa blanda)
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Título
From Morality to Virtue
Idioma
Inglés
Publicado en
1995
Formato
Tapa blanda
Páginas
296
ISBN10
0195093925
ISBN13
9780195093926
Serie
Etiquetas
Calificación
3 de 5
Descripción
Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being