Lobbying in the European Union

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Why can some interest groups influence policy-making while others cannot? This central question in politics remains underexplored. Understanding lobbying success is particularly vital for scholars of European politics, as the EU presents a significant opportunity structure for organized interests. This work illuminates the role of interest groups in European policy-making and significantly contributes to the study of EU politics and interest groups. The author develops a comprehensive theoretical model to explain lobbying success, supported by extensive empirical analysis of interest group influence within the EU. Utilizing a large, innovative dataset, the research incorporates diverse sources, including quantitative text analysis of European Commission consultations, an online survey of interest groups, information from interest group websites, and legislative data from EU databases. The analysis covers 56 policy issues and 2,696 interest groups, revealing that lobbying operates as an exchange where European institutions trade influence for information, citizen support, and economic power. Crucially, the findings indicate that success depends not just on individual groups but on how they form issue-specific lobbying coalitions. Lobbying is a collective endeavor, where the information supply, citizen backing, and economic strength of entire coalitions are key to achieving lobbying success.