Mitigating the shadow of conflict

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The history of mankind has been shaped by conflicts on both interpersonal and national levels, often stemming from the desire to secure valuable resources for consumption or production. These conflicts not only influence investment and production incentives but also lead to the waste of valuable resources that could be used more productively. This realization has prompted the development of institutions aimed at mitigating and regulating conflicts, making them less wasteful. These institutions vary from formal structures, like property rights and legal systems, to informal ones, such as social norms, and have evolved significantly across cultures and history. The central theme explores how informal rules can reduce conflict and the conditions under which individuals create such rules. It analyzes the impact of moral norms on societal conflict levels, noting that strategic effects among parties can sometimes increase overall conflict efforts if the influence of moral rules changes asymmetrically. Additionally, it examines the role of social capital and the incentives for investing in it. Finally, the thesis presents initial steps toward understanding how normative preferences can be influenced, contributing to the broader discourse on conflict resolution and institutional design.