Understanding different components in intentional action

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The question of whether there is a human-specific understanding of others' intentional actions is crucial, as it may be a prerequisite for advanced social learning and the development of unique human culture. This study explores whether great apes, like humans, interpret actions based on underlying mental states. Through a series of experiments using various methods—such as copying actions, object choice, and dwell-time—the research compares mother-reared individuals from all four great ape species, enculturated chimpanzees, and human infants. This comprehensive approach provides insights into how developmental and comparative psychologists investigate the ability of our closest relatives to infer mental states and predict behavior. Participants were placed in naturalistic and straightforward test scenarios, allowing chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans to showcase skills typically regarded as uniquely human. The findings suggest that great apes grasp fundamental aspects of intentional action, including goals, intentions, and desires. Consequently, the differences in understanding intentional actions between humans and nonhuman primates may be less pronounced than previously thought.