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Daniel D. Hutto

    Este autor profundiza en cuestiones fundamentales de la naturaleza humana, buscando comprenderla de una manera que respete las ciencias naturales y, al mismo tiempo, rechace la metafísica impersonal del naturalismo contemporáneo. Su trabajo se centra en la filosofía de la mente, la psicología y la ciencia cognitiva, donde es conocido por promover enfoques radicalmente no representacionales de la cognición enactiva y corporizada. Un área clave de investigación implica el papel crítico que desempeña la interacción con las narrativas, entendidas como artefactos públicos, en el sustento de las formas de cognición distintivamente humanas. Escribiendo con pulcritud, sofisticación y perspicacia, este autor aborda problemas desafiantes con un notable espíritu de aventura.

    Radicalizing Enactivism
    Evolving Enactivism
    Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy
    • Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy

      • 256 páginas
      • 9 horas de lectura

      What is the true worth of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? Answers to this question are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" and "therapeutic" interpretations. In their place, it seeks to establish that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein regarded clarification as the true end of philosophy. It argues that, properly understood, his approach exemplifies rather than betrays critical philosophy and provides a viable alternative to other contemporary offerings.

      Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy
    • Evolving Enactivism

      • 360 páginas
      • 13 horas de lectura

      An extended argument that cognitive phenomena-perceiving, imagining, remembering-can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition.

      Evolving Enactivism
    • Radicalizing Enactivism

      • 232 páginas
      • 9 horas de lectura

      A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality-intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience-are best understood as embodied yet contentless.

      Radicalizing Enactivism