Focusing on military strategy and effectiveness, this book analyzes evidence from past conflicts to extract valuable lessons relevant to contemporary warfare, particularly the ongoing situation in Afghanistan. It emphasizes the importance of understanding military capabilities and their implications for future operations, offering insights that can inform both policy and tactical decisions in similar scenarios.
James H Lebovic Libros



Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States
US National Security Policy after 9/11
- 244 páginas
- 9 horas de lectura
The book argues against the belief that current US adversaries, including rogue states and terrorist groups, are beyond deterrence. It asserts that deterrence remains a relevant and vital strategy, challenging the notion that it is outdated since the Cold War. The author emphasizes the need for the United States to adapt its policies to effectively engage with these threats, suggesting that a renewed focus on deterrence could reshape national security strategies.
This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics. During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.