In 1993, a newly-appointed CIA director warned that Western powers might have 'slain a large dragon' with the fall of the USSR, but now faced a 'bewildering variety of poisonous snakes'. Since then, both dragons (state enemies like Russia and China) and snakes (terrorist and guerrilla organisations) have watched the US struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mastered new methods in response: hybrid and urban warfare, political manipulation, and harnessing digital technology.Leading soldier-scholar David Kilcullen reveals everything the West's opponents have learned from twenty-first-century conflict and explains how their cutting-edge tactics and adaptability pose a serious threat to America and its allies, disabling the West's military advantage.The Dragons and the Snakes is a compelling, counterintuitive look at the new, vastly complex global arena. Kilcullen reshapes our understanding of the West's foes, and shows how it can respond.
In The Dragons and the Snakes, David Kilcullen asks what the opponents of the West have learned in the past quarter-century and how they have evolved. He shows how Russia, China, Iran and North Korea developed new tactics by copying terrorists and guerrillas, and how guerrilla groups have been able to access new technologies that allowed them to take on the states that oppose them. More broadly, Kilcullen explains how evolution happens in combat, how states and non-state groups copy each other, how our enemies have sought to exploit our tunnel-vision on terrorism since 9/11, and how we can respond.
Focusing on the Surge campaign of 2007 in Iraq, this book features an introduction and annotated tactical case studies that provide insights into its success. An appendix outlines key principles, making it a valuable resource for field officers, students, and general readers interested in military strategy and operations.
From the Publisher: David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare. A Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, his vision of war dramatically influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the surge." Now, in The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror. Kilcullen takes us "on the ground" to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the big global war (the "War on Terrorism") and its relation to the associated "small wars" across the globe: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chechnya, Pakistan and North Africa. Kilcullen sees today's conflicts as a complex pairing of contrasting trends: local social networks and worldwide movements; traditional and postmodern culture; local insurgencies seeking autonomy and a broader pan-Islamic campaign. He warns that America's actions in the war on terrorism have tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thus enormously complicating our challenges. Indeed, the US had done a poor job of applying different tactics to these very different situations, continually misidentifying insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances (whom he calls "accidental guerrillas") as part of a coordinated worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary. Colored with gripping battlefield experiences that range from the jungles and highlands of Southeast Asia to the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the dusty towns of the Middle East, The Accidental Guerrilla will, quite simply, change the way we think about war. This much anticipated book will be a must read for everyone concerned about the war on terror
'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson of America's role in supporting the mujahideen against the Soviet Union. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' The scandal-prone US Congressman lamented the absence of support for Afghanistan after that war, a vacuum which the Taliban and Osama bin Laden would fill. The Ledger identifies and assesses the failures of the West's approach to Afghanistan after 9/11 - military, diplomatic, political and developmental. For Afghans, the war is not over because the West has declared it so, and neither will its geo-political effects simply disappear along with the last of NATO forces. Afghanistan remains connected to the world through communications and the networks of the last twenty years. The Ledger also considers these lessons for the benefit of future, similar peacebuilding missions in Africa and elsewhere. Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan conflict, having worked with the international mission as advisers and within the Arg. Both have considerable experience of counter-insurgency and stability operations elsewhere, in Latin America, Asia and across Africa. There is plenty of blame to go around, as this book shows, in the attempts to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11. The signs of the collapse had been there for a long-time, mostly conveniently ignored as they were ill-suited to the political narrative of 'we're making progress' and then, as the deadline drew closer, 'mission accomplished'. In understanding why and where the failure took place, The Ledger warns against the eternal human curse in believing that we can be an exception to all that precedes us. Whatever the desire to avoid future military and diplomatic 'quagmires', the reality is that politicians will not always follow that advice, nor can these crises always be avoided
David Kilcullen, a leading expert on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, served as a Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, significantly influencing America's military strategy during the surge. In this insightful exploration of the War on Terror, Kilcullen offers a fresh perspective, delving into the realities of modern warfare and its connections to various global conflicts, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa. He identifies a complex interplay of local social networks and global movements, traditional and postmodern cultures, and local insurgencies versus broader pan-Islamic campaigns. Kilcullen warns that U.S. actions have often conflated these dynamics, obscuring the distinction between local and global struggles and complicating the challenges faced. He argues that the U.S. has misidentified insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances—whom he terms "accidental guerrillas"—as part of a coordinated global terror network. To address these issues, he emphasizes the need to disentangle these strands, develop effective strategies for global threats, avoid unnecessary local conflicts, and succeed in those that are essential. Rich with gripping battlefield experiences from diverse regions, this work will fundamentally alter perceptions of war and is essential reading for those invested in understanding the complexities of the war on terror.
