Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence: Evaluating Options for Complicating Adversary Decisionmaking
- 118 páginas
- 5 horas de lectura
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy called for the military to enhance operational unpredictability to deter attacks on U.S. partners. This report defines U.S. operational unpredictability as adversary uncertainty regarding U.S. combat strategies. It outlines four potential approaches to increase this unpredictability and evaluates their implications for U.S. relations with Russia and China. Additionally, it analyzes two Cold War-era instances where the U.S. aimed for greater operational unpredictability. The findings suggest that enhancing adversaries' perceptions of U.S. unpredictability may be achievable with insights into their operational analysis and decision-making. Publicizing new U.S. capabilities could be the most effective method, showcasing multiple options for achieving strategic objectives. However, pursuing operational unpredictability may incur costs and negative consequences, such as diminished military effectiveness and heightened threat perceptions from China and Russia. The authors advise carefully considering the potential costs and effectiveness of these strategies compared to traditional deterrence methods.
