What caused the fall of Rome? Since Gibbon's day scholars have hotly debated the question & come up with the answers ranging from blood poisoning to immorality. In recent years, however, the most likely explanation has been neglected: wasn't it above all else a military collapse? Prof. Ferrill believes it was, & puts forth his case in this provocative book. Preface The decline & fall of Rome The grand strategy of the Roman empire Crises on the frontiers in the 4th century Theodosius the great AD 378-395 The turning point: AD 406-410 The grand strategy of the western Roman empire in the early 5th century Aetius, the vandals & the Huns The fall of Rome Table of Emperors Notes Select Bibliography Illustration Credits Index
Arther Ferrill Orden de los libros (cronológico)
What caused the fall of Rome? Since Gibbon's day scholars have hotly debated the question & come up with the answers ranging from blood poisoning to immorality. In recent years, however, the most likely explanation has been neglected: wasn't it above all else a military collapse? Prof. Ferrill believes it was, & puts forth his case in this provocative book. Preface The decline & fall of Rome The grand strategy of the Roman empire Crises on the frontiers in the 4th century Theodosius the great AD 378-395 The turning point: AD 406-410 The grand strategy of the western Roman empire in the early 5th century Aetius, the vandals & the Huns The fall of Rome Table of Emperors Notes Select Bibliography Illustration Credits Index
When did war begin? Archaeologist and historians have in the past been curiously reluctant to study the early history of organized warfare. Standard military accounts tend to start with the Graeco-Persian wars and to lay undue emphasis on the pre-eminence of Greek heavy infantry. But, as this strikingly original and entertaining book shows, the origins of war can be traced back, not to the Iron Age, or even to the Bronze Age, but to the emergence of settled life itself nearly 10,000 years ago. The military revolution that occurred at that time -the major new weapons, the massive fortifications, the creation of strategy and tactics -ultimately gave rise to the great war of machines of ancient Egypt, Assyria and Persia which dominated the Near East to the time of Alexander the Great. It is Professor Ferrill's thesis that in the period before Alexander there were two independent lines of military development, a Near Eastern one culminating in the expert integration of cavalry, skirmishers and light infantry, and a Greek one based on heavy infantry. When Philip and Alexander blended the two traditions in their crack Macedonian army, the result was a style of warfare that continued, despite technological changes, down to Napoleon. To prove his point, as a tailpiece Professor Ferril recreates the battle of Waterloo as if Alexander were in Napoleon's shoes, and concludes that it would have been a "near-run thing." Complete with detailed and copiously illustrated account of all the major battles on land and sea up to the fourth century BC, analysis of weapons from the sling to the catapult, and discussion of ancient strategy and tactics, this is a book for armchair historians everywhere.--Dust jacket flap.