Roland Strausz

January 1, 1970

On incentives and asymmetric information in organizations

Agotado

Roland Strausz On incentives and asymmetric information in organizations

4,3

Moral hazard in sequential teams

Agotado

Roland Strausz Moral hazard in sequential teams

4,3

Regulation in a political economy

Agotado

Roland Strausz Regulation in a political economy

4,3

Mitigating non-contractable actions by randomness

Agotado

Roland Strausz Mitigating non-contractable actions by randomness

4,3

Getting to know your agent

Agotado

Roland Strausz Getting to know your agent

4,3

Timing of verification procedures

Agotado

Roland Strausz Timing of verification procedures

4,3

Burried in paperwork

Agotado

Roland Strausz Burried in paperwork

4,3

Managers and the limited commitment of ordinayry shares

Agotado

Roland Strausz Managers and the limited commitment of ordinayry shares

4,3

Honest certification and the threat of capture

Agotado

Roland Strausz Honest certification and the threat of capture

4,3

Regulating availability in bargain sales

Agotado

Roland Strausz Regulating availability in bargain sales

4,3

Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal agent models

Agotado

Roland Strausz Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal agent models

4,3