Reduction in the philosophy of mind

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The modern philosophy of mind largely revolves around reductionism and anti-reductionism, seeking to either liberate the field from its Cartesian roots or reinterpret them in contemporary terms. Key debates, including those on type- and token-theories, functionalism, supervenience, mechanistic explanations, consciousness, and phenomenality, are intricately linked to these issues. As a result, the nature of reduction and the validity of reductionism have emerged as central questions in philosophy of mind, as well as in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, particularly in the early second half of the last century. Recent advancements in neuroscience, heralded as a step toward a natural science of the mind, have reignited interest in these topics. Furthermore, new interpretations of reduction models suggest that challenges to reductionism, particularly those stemming from the notion of multiple realizability of mental kinds, may not undermine reductionist claims. Strategies such as identifying mental kinds with disjunctive or contextualized kinds aim to reconcile the concept of multiple realizability with reductionism, indicating a nuanced approach to these enduring philosophical debates.