Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law I-II

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Vol. I operationalizes the specific-anticompetitive-intent and lessening-competition tests of illegality under U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, along with the distorting-competition and exploitative-abuse-of-dominant-position tests from E.U. law. It distinguishes these from an economic-inefficiency test of illegality, lists antitrust categories of profits, and develops systems for analyzing conduct’s impact on competition in price and quality. The volume argues that definitions of economic and antitrust markets are inherently arbitrary and critiques various market-definition protocols proposed by scholars and officials. It explains the inadequacy of market-oriented approaches to assessing a firm’s economic power or conduct’s antitrust illegality, analyzes the profitability of oligopolistic and predatory conduct, and proposes protocols for determining illegal conduct while critiquing existing scholarly and official methods. It also examines U.S. and E.U. case law and the European Commission’s stance on predatory conduct. Vol. II employs non-market-oriented approaches to assess the legality of various mergers and collaborative arrangements under antitrust law, analyzes the competitive impact of rules allowing vertical conduct among rivals, reviews relevant case law, and discusses the positions of U.S. DOJ, FTC, and the European Commission on these matters. The volume concludes with a comparison of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law as writ