Modest Nonconceptualism

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The author defends nonconceptualism, asserting that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and possesses nonconceptual content. Engaging with the ongoing debate from the past two decades, she presents a novel version known as Modest Nonconceptualism, offering a systematic overview of key controversies. The discussion begins with an explanation of nonconceptual content and a distinction among various nonconceptualist views. The author counters claims that the failure to differentiate between state and content views poses significant issues for these perspectives. She refines central arguments supporting nonconceptualism, including those related to fineness of grain, contradictory contents, and perceptions in animals and infants, as well as concept acquisition. Additionally, she addresses two major objections: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity, providing novel rebuttals. Modest Nonconceptualism permits some conceptual elements in perceptual experiences, highlighting the importance of concept employment in understanding both conceptual and nonconceptual mental states. It aligns with the Autonomy Thesis by asserting that genuine content-bearing perceptual experiences can occur without concept possession. The work concludes with an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief while remaining compatible with epistemological internalism.