Self-representation in international criminal procedure

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When Slobodan Milosevic declared his intention to refuse counsel and conduct his own defense, it marked a significant moment for international tribunals. Although provisions for self-representation existed in the Nuremberg and Tokyo procedural documents, historical records indicate that these were never formally utilized. This examination delves into the legal foundations of self-representation, assessing them for a unified approach in international criminal procedure. It explores how domestic legal systems have traditionally addressed defendants waiving counsel, the context of the defense provisions from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and the treatment of this issue in international human rights law. Additionally, it analyzes what negotiations surrounding relevant rules and treaties reveal about the drafters' intentions. The findings illustrate a complex landscape, characterized by diverging approaches and dissenting opinions that obscure a straightforward path. The procedural mechanisms employed by the ICTY to clarify these issues are innovative yet have proven somewhat ineffective, with defendants often obstructing proceedings, leading to delays and increased costs. Ongoing questions persist regarding the correct interpretation of the law, the management of such trials, and whether future tribunals should adopt a more conservative stance when faced with self-representing defendants.